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DEFENDING FALSE STATEMENT CHARGES




O N AUGUST 1, 1990, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) published a Final Rule in the Federal Reg-
ister revising Parts 61 and 67 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs) as it relates to the FAA's Medical Ap-
plication Form (Form).' In essence, the revisions have
five significant aspects with reference to drug or alcohol-
related driving adjudications: (1) they define a "motor ve-
hicle action" as a conviction, cancellation, suspension,
revocation or denial of an application for a license to op-
erate a motor vehicle; (2) they provide for denial, suspen-
sion or revocation of an airman's certificate if he suffers a
second "motor vehicle action" within a three-year period;
(3) they impose a duty on the airman to report his motor
vehicle action to FAA security within sixty days; (4) they
provide for denial, suspension or revocation of any rating
of an airman who fails to report his motor vehicle action;
* Alan Armstrong practices law in Atlanta, Georgia with an emphasis on per-
sonal injury and aviation matters. He serves as the Chairman of the NTSB Bar
Association's Committee on Legislative and Regulatory Activity, and he is a certi-
fied flight instructor. The author expresses appreciation to Matthew H. Perry,
Esq. of the Florida Bar who provided materials employed in the preparation of
this paper.
I Pilots Convicted of Alcohol or Drug Related Motor Vehicle Offenses or Sub-
ject to State Motor Vehicle Administrative Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,300
(1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(c)(1), (3), 61.15(d)(1),(2); 61.15(e)(1)-
(5); 61.15(0(1), (2)).
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and, (5) they require that the airman give his written con-
sent to allow the FAA to access his driving record before
he may obtain his medical certificate.2
This paper reviews the historical context in which the
Form has been revised, examines the FAR revisions which
relate to the driving and other convictions of an airman,
and attempts to glean some insight into the elements of a
prima facie case and the defenses presented where an air-
man is charged with making false entries on the Form with
the intent to deceive the FAA.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Department of Transportation Study of Pilots With
DUI Records
According to a 1986 report prepared by the Inspector
General of the Department of Transportation (DOT),
16,000 of America's 700,049 active pilots had sustained a
revocation or suspension of their driving privileges based
upon driving under the influence (DUI) convictions.3
Although these pilots had suffered a loss of their driving
privileges, there had been no suspension or revocation of
their flying privileges.4 A DOT official called the findings
in the report "surprising and alarming."' 5 On February
17, 1987, DOT/FAA gave notice that the Office of Inspec-
tor General (OIG) would conduct two computer matches
comparing the FAA's medical files with criminal history
records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and driver's license records from the Florida Department
of Highway Safety (First Notice).6 On the same day as the
First Notice was given, Anthony J. Broderick, Associate
2 Id. at 31,309.




See Privacy Act of 1974: Matching Program - Federal Aviation Administra-
tion General Air Transportation Records on Individuals/Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation Identification Records, 52 Fed. Reg. 5374 (1987) [hereinafter First
Notice].
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Administrator for Aviation Standards, wrote a memoran-
dum to the Assistant Inspector General for Investiga-
tions.7 Among other things, the Broderick Memorandum
discussed (1) the then-contemplated drafting of a "rule
change proposal", (2) the OIG's "requesting from the
FBI a computer match to find all those applicants for a
medical certificate who appear to fall within FAR 61.15(a)
[sic], which deals with drug convictions", and (3) "an ap-
propriate 'cutoff' date ... [of] January 1, 1986," beyond
which the Agency would not "feel comfortable pursuing
[certificates] for revocation or suspension .. 8.
Although the matching program was originally sched-
uled to begin in February of 1987,9 a DOT/FAA notice
dated March 6, 1987, (Second Notice)10 delayed its imple-
mentation until March of 1987." On October 29, 1987,
the FAA published a "notice of enforcement policy"
(Third Notice)' 2 announcing that OIG had "identified
some airmen who appear to have falsified their applica-
tions with regard to their record of traffic convictions."'' 3
The Third Notice announced the adoption of a policy
whereby airmen who had failed to disclose records of traf-
fic or other convictions could avoid FAA certificate action
for alleged false statements on their medical application
forms if the airmen reported their convictions to the FAA
(the Amnesty Program).' 4
Another notice of enforcement policy was published on
7 Memorandum from Anthony J. Broderick, Associate Administrator for Avia-
tion Standards (AVS-1) to Assistant Inspector General Investigations (JI-l) (Feb.
17, 1987) (on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce) [hereinafter Broderick
Memorandum].
* Id.
* First Notice, supra note 6, at 5374.
to Privacy Act of 1974: Matching Program - Federal Aviation Administration
General Air Transportation Records on Individuals/State of Florida Department
of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Driver's License Records, 52 Fed. Reg.
8545 (1987) [hereinafter Second Notice].
11 Id.
12 Falsification of Airman Medical Certificate Applications; Record of Traffic
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November 1, 1988,15 announcing the expiration of the
Amnesty Program effective December 1, 1988 (Fourth
Notice). 16 While the Amnesty Program was in effect, how-
ever, it offered no protection to airmen who disclosed
their convictions to the FAA from criminal prosecutions
by the Department of Justice (DOJ). 17
B. The Ruling of Judge Carr Finding the Form
Constitutionally Infirm
Before the Amnesty Program expired, a number of pi-
lots were indicted in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida. 18 These airmen were
charged with making false or fraudulent statements to the
United States, an offense carrying a term of up to five
years imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine.' 9 Before trial,
the Broderick Memorandum was discovered in which the
Associate Administrator for Aviation Standards made the
following observations to the Assistant Inspector General:
We also need to think about changing the form and sub-
stance of the questions asked on the Form 8500-8 [FAA's
Medical Application Form], as we discussed. It has not
generally been possible to successfully prosecute people
in the past in part because of the vague, qualitative, and
evaluative nature of these questions. As you know, dozens
of such cases were returned to us as declined for prosecu-
tion a few years ago. We would be pleased to receive any
suggestions you have for improvement in this area.20
The record disclosed that the Broderick Memorandum
was written over nineteen months before the Florida
indictments.
The supposed basis for these criminal prosecutions
15 Falsification of Airman Medical Certificate Applications; Record of Traffic
Convictions, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,166 (1980) [hereinafter Fourth Notice].
I Id.
17 See, e.g., J.S. Yodice, FAA "Amnesty" Practice, AOPA PILOT, Nov. 1987.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Manapat, No. 88-00325-CR-T-13 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8,
1988), aff'd, 928 F.2d 1097 (11 th Cir. 1991).
it) See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
2o, Broderick Memorandum, supra note 7.
FALSE STATEMENTS
concerned the "medical conditions" portion of the form,
specifically questions 21V and 21W on the FAA Form
8500-8 and required applicants to describe each condition
in the "Remarks" portion which followed that caption.2'
Because the matters complained of by the Government
(criminal or traffic convictions) were not properly describ-
able as "medical conditions", Judge George C. Carr
granted a Motion to Dismiss in one of this series of cases
saying:
I have given this a great deal of thought; and after review-
ing the basis of the charge - that is the so-called "air-
man's medical certificate" - I have determined that it is a
matter of fundamental fairness. And the way their ques-
tion has been put on this form, which is basically to deter-
mine medical conditions, is fundamentally unfair; that is
the way it is put is vague. It is misleading and confusing.
It is ambiguous, and the way it is configured in the form
amounts to a trick question; and I think it is fundamentally
unfair to base a felony conviction on any answers that may
be given by anybody on this form. And it is so fundamen-
tally unfair that it amounts to a denial of due process.22
Furthermore, Judge Carr noted that "It]he Agency itself is
cognizant of the fact that their form is confusing and mis-
leading, and it is a danger to basic justice to bring prose-
cutions on the basis of this form in the Court's opinion." 23
After Judge Carr announced his decision from the
bench to dismiss the charges against one of the airmen,
the Government attorney indicated there were two pilots
who wished to enter guilty pleas,2 4 to which Judge Carr
responded: "I am not going to accept a plea of guilty to a
charge that I think is baseless ....
21 See FAA Medical Application Form 8500-8 (10-75), O.M.B. No. 04-R0089
[hereinafter Form 8900-8] (on file with Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
22 United States v. Manapat, No. 88-00325-CR-T-13, slip op. at 2-3 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 8, 1988), aff'd, 928 F.2d 1097 (11 th Cir. 1991).
- Id. at 4.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id.
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C. The Eleventh Circuit's Affirmance in Manapat26
Judge Carr's decision was recently affirmed by the
United States Circuit Court of Appeal for the Eleventh
Circuit.2 7
The Eleventh Circuit cited United States v. Lattimore,28
reasoning that the false statement charge asserted against
Manapat was similar to a perjury charge which, although
subjective, "must have certain objective standards. 29
The Court reasoned that a phrase is fundamentally am-
biguous if it is not one "with a meaning about which men
of ordinary intelligence could agree. ' 30  Context is also
important. After noting the two convictions questions ap-
peared under the caption "Medical History," the Eleventh
Circuit observed that the prosecution of a false statement
claim could not be established "by isolating a statement
from context."' 3 1 The court further affirmed Judge Carr's
decision by observing that its holding would "not pre-
clude the government from refusing to grant a certificate,
or from revoking a certificate already granted, if the appli-
cant falsely responds to the government's requests for
information. 32
The court, however, cautioned that problems with fun-
damentally ambiguous questions appearing on the Form
could be avoided "by providing a separate form for
26 United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1991).
27 Id. Given the Eleventh Circuit's agreement with Judge Carr, it has become
increasingly apparent that the FAA and DOJ should stop prosecuting pilots and
revise its admittedly ambiguous Form. See also Alan Armstrong, Is the FAA's Medi-
cal Application Form Too ambiguous to Safisfy Due Process?, 14 AIR LAW, 109 (1989),
reprinted in 11 LAWYER-PILOTs BAR Ass'N J. 20 (1989); Alan Armstrong, Ruling on
Medical Certificates, 58 AIR LINE PILOT 32 (1989).
2" 127 F. Supp. 405 (D.D.C.), aff'd by an equally divided court, 232 F.2d 334 (D.C.
Cir. 1955).
2 3 Manapat, 928 F.2d at 1100.
.4 Id.
31 Id. at 1101. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit observed that in modern society,
people are often asked to fill out similar forms asking for medical information. "If
these forms do require such critical information, unwary citizens should be able to
expect that important questions will not be hidden in laundry lists of unrelated
topics." Id.
.- Id. at 1102.
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convictions. 33
D. Disagreement Between the Administrative Law Judges About
Whether or Not the Form is Fundamentally Ambiguous
After the Eleventh Circuit rendered its decision in
Manapat, there was disagreement among the NTSB Law
Judges about whether or not the "conviction questions"
appearing on the Form were fundamentally ambiguous so
as to preclude an adjudication on the merits of alleged
false statement charges against airmen by the Agency. On
May 7, 199 1, Judge Davis granted a motion to dismiss in a
Medical Form case citing Manapat 4 Two days later,
Judge Coffman denied a motion to dismiss in a similar
case, reasoning that the lower standard of proof in admin-
istrative proceedings rendered the decision of the Elev-
enth Circuit in Manapat inapplicable in aviation
enforcement proceedings.3 5 Thirteen days after Judge
Coffman's Order denying a motion to dismiss, Judge Da-
vis, again granted a motion to dismiss relying on
Manapat 6 Nine days after Judge Davis' second order
granting a motion to dismiss, Judge Mullins postponed a
hearing pending review of the Medical Form issue by the
Board3 7 and postponed a second hearing four days later
" Id. In addition to relying on Lattimore, the Eleventh Circuit cited United
States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) for the proposition that the defend-
ant's answer to a fundamentally ambiguous question should not be submitted to
the jury in a false statement charge. In Ryan, the defendant was charged with
making a false statement to a federally-insured bank in his response to a question
asking for his "previous address" during the past 5 years without defining the
term "address" as related to: (1) the applicant's residence, (2) mailing address, (3)
previous address, (4) most recent previous address, or (5) all previous addresses.
Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015-16; Manapat, 928 F.2d at 1100.
.4 See Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Cancelling
Hearing and Terminating Proceeding, Administrator v. Howard, N.T.S.B. No. SE-
11512 (May 7, 1991) (Davis, J.).
35 See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Administrator v. Scarborough, NTSB
No. SE-11719 (May 9, 1991) (Coffman, J.).
-6 See Initial Decision and Order, Administrator v. Holey, NTSB No. SE- 11727
(May 22, 1991) (Davis, J.).
I See Order Postponing Hearing, Administrator v. Hamm, NTSB No. SE- 11362
(May 31, 1991) (Mullins, J.).
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for the same reason.3 8
Fourteen days after Judge Mullins' second order post-
poning a hearing, Judge Capps granted a continuance and
cancelled a hearing,39 but she subsequently denied two
motions to dismiss in Medical Form cases.4 °
Although the Agency abandoned its appeal in Judge
Davis' first decision declaring the Form fundamentally
ambiguous, 4' on July 1, 1991, it filed motions for expe-
dited review in two cases urging the Board to deal with
the question of whether or not the "convictions" ques-
tions were fundamentally ambiguous to avoid further
chaos.4 2
E. Other Recent Developments
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
conviction of an airman for allegedly giving a false state-
ment in response to the questions on the Form in United
States v. Rodriguez,43 the affirmance was without opinion. It
therefore has no precedential value.44 An airman who
suffered a criminal conviction on January 16, 1991, for
making a false statement on the Form concerning a "traf-
fic conviction" is appealing to the Third Circuit. It will be
interesting to see how the Third Circuit rules on that ap-
peal in light of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
38 See Order Postponing (sic), Administrator v. Garrison, NTSB No. SE-10855
(June 3, 1991) (Mullins, J.).
39 See Order Granting Continuance and Cancelling Hearing, Administrator v.
Odum, NTSB No. SE-11453 (une 17, 1991) (Capps, J.).
40 See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Administrator v. Kuebrich, NTSB No.
SE- 11679 (June 19, 1991) (Capps, J.); Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Admin-
istrator v. Bishop, NTSB No. SE- 11657 (June 25, 1991) (Capps, J.).
41 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42 See Motion to Expedite Review, Administrator v. Barghelame, NTSB No. SE-
11108 (July 1, 1991); Motion to Expedite Review, Administrator v. Sue, NTSB
No. SE-II100 (July 1, 1991).
4- 925 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1991).
44 See Internal Operating Procedures, 3d Cir. § 5.1.2 (indicating memorandum
opinions may be employed "to affirm the judgment, order or decision of the court
under review ... [when the court] determines that a written opinion will have no
precedential or institutional value .... ").
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Manapat.45
In a letter from the Federal Air Surgeon to airmen
dated June 14, 1991, the Agency announced employment
of "a revised application form for airman medical certifi-
cation" effective July 1, 1991.46 One reason given in the
Jordan letter for promulgation of the revised form was "to
ensure it (the FAA) is gathering all information necessary
to determine eligibility for airmen medical certifica-
tion."' 47 The Federal Air Surgeon stated: "[t]he new form
also implements the so-called 'DWI Rule', part of which
mandates that an applicant provide authorization for the
FAA to access the National Driver Register to verify infor-
mation provided by the applicant on the application.1 4
On July 22, 1991, 4,000 pilots were under investigation
and 84 cases had been sent to the Agency's Chief Counsel
for possible enforcement action for possible misinforma-
tion appearing on the revised Form.4 9
F. The FAA's Proposals Following Judge Carr's Ruling
Following dismissal of several of the criminal cases in
Florida, the Federal Air Surgeon's Medical Bulletin 50 in-
formed Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs) of the
following:
(1) That twenty-seven indictments in Florida and six in
Colorado related to airmen who did not "disclose alcohol
and drug-related convictions on medical certificate
applications";
45 United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1991).
4c Letter to airmen from Jon L.Jordan, M.D., Acting Federal Air Surgeon (June
14, 1991) (captioned: "Federal Aviation Administration Office of Aviation
Medicine - Revision to the Application for Airman Medical Certificate or Airman
Medical and Student Pilot Certificate - Official Use Starts July 1, 1991.") (on file
with journal of Air Law and Commerce).
47 Id.
49 Id.
41, See Safety Board Deletes FAA Recommendations From 'Most Wanted' List, AIR SAFETY
WK., July 22, 1991, at 3.
." See Federal Air Surgeon Enlists AMEs' Help, AIR LINE PILOT, Apr. 1988, at 33
(containing excerpts from the January 1988 Federal Air Surgeon's Medical
Bulletin).
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(2) That those convicted could be sentenced to five years
in prison and fines of from $5,000 to $250,000;
(3) That "AMEs need to stress to applicants the impor-
tance of disclosing convictions for any reason, in any pe-
riod of time";
(4) That "[p]hysicians who are aware of an applicant's
convictions, but who fail to insist on full disclosure, also
may be in violation of Federal requirements"; and
(5) That "AME interviews by investigators for the IG or
local U.S. Attorney's Offices began in October [1988] and
are expected to continue indefinitely."'"
Moreover, on April 14, 1989, the Agency published an-
other notice of enforcement policy (Fifth Notice)5 2 which
indicated the OIG had "referred to the FAA more than
6,000 cases of airmen with drug- or alcohol-related con-
victions, ' 53 most involving airmen who had not disclosed
these matters on their application forms.54
On May 18, 1989, however, the FAA published a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) calling for revisions to
Parts 61 and 67 of the Federal Air Regulations (FARs).
The NPRM had five essential elements, all of which re-
lated to the airman's driving record. 56  The Agency had
historically been authorized to seek a revocation or a sus-
pension of a pilot's certificate in four circumstances: (1)
operating an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol
or drugs;5 7 (2) operating an aircraft engaged in the car-
riage of narcotic drugs;58 (3) being convicted of any fed-
eral or state statute relating to the possession,
- /d.
52 Drug Convictions; Drug- and Alcohol-Related Traffic Convictions; Falsifica-
tion of Airman Medical Applications, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,144 (1989) [hereinafter
Fifth Notice].
" Id.
-14 Id. The Fifth Notice was published shortly after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
.15 See Pilots Convicted of Alcohol or Drug Related Motor Vehicle Offenses are
Subject to State Motor Vehicle Administrative Procedures, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,580
(1989) [hereinafter NPRM 89-12].
.- Id. at 21,585-86.
.1' 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a)(l)-(4) (1991).
- 14 C.F.R. § 91.19(a) (1991).
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manufacture or transportation of narcotic drugs; 59 and (4)
refusing a request by a law enforcement officer to submit
to a drug test.60 It was a radical departure from existing
regulatory authority for the Agency to suspend or revoke
a pilot's license based upon operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated.
The NPRM proposed (1) to define a "motor vehicle ac-
tion" as any conviction, cancellation, or denial of applica-
tion for a motor vehicle license when any of those
problems arose from "the operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated by alcohol or a drug"; 61 (2) to amend
FAR § 61.15 by inserting subparagraph (d) which would
provide for the denial, suspension or revocation of any
certificate or rating issued to an airman in the event he
suffered a "motor vehicle action within 3 years of a previ-
ous motor vehicle action"; 62 (3) to amend FAR § 61.15 by
inserting subparagraph (e) to require an airman to pro-
vide information about the "motor vehicle action" to the
FAA Airman Codification Branch within sixty days after
the effective date of a Final Rule implementing the NPRM
or sixty days after the motor vehicle action, whichever was
later;63 (4) to insert subparagraph (d) to FAR § 61.23 to
provide that an airman's medical certificate would expire
on the sixty-first day following a motor vehicle action;64
59 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(a)(1), (2) (1991). Historically, the National Transportation
Safety Board distinguished between offenses involving aircraft and those unre-
lated to aircraft, the former warranting revocation and the latter warranting a sus-
pension. See Administrator v. Pekarcik, 3 N.T.S.B. 2903 (1980).
6 14 C.F.R. § 61.14(b) (1)-(2) (proposed May 18, 1989).
- 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,585 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(c)(l)-(3) (1991)).
62 Id. (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(d) (1991)).
33 Id. (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(e)(1)-(2) (1991)).
Sd. (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.23(d)(1)-(2) (1991)). This automatic sus-
pension or expiration provision would have compelled the pilot to go to his AME
and have the AME make a determination as to whether the pilot could substanti-
ate his participation in an alcohol or substance abuse treatment program or
whether the pilot could demonstrate his "compliance with a court-ordered pro-
gram resulting from the motor vehicle action, if any." Id. The problem with the
provision was that it would have required AMEs to determine about whether ap-
plicants were meeting supposed obligations under a substance abuse treatment
program and/or whether they were meeting their legal obligations under a court-
ordered program. Id.
3671991]
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and (5) to re4uire that applicants give the FAA access to
their driving records. 5
On July 13, 1989, the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA) filed its comments on the public docket in opposi-
tion to NPRM 89-12. ALPA asserted (1) that pilots should
be given more than sixty days to report their past driving
offenses; 66 (2) that there was no rational basis to support
the FAA's assertion that driving under the influence of-
fenses are related to FAA safety regulations or FAA medi-
cal standards;67 and (3) that the FAA should not require
pilots to permit access to their driving records as a condi-
tion to obtaining a medical certificate. 6aAdditionally,
ALPA observed that, although a pilot "may request ' 69 that
his driving records be transmitted to the FAA under 1987
amendments to the National Driver Register Act,7 ° the
Agency had transmuted the permissive aspect of the stat-
ute into a mandatory obligation in violation of the
Agency's statutory authority.7
6. Id. at 21,586 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 67.3) (1991)).
Comments of Air Line Pilots Association, In the Matter of Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 89-12 - Pilots Convicted of Alcohol or Drugs [sic] Related
Motor Vehicle Offenses or Subject to Motor Vehicle Administrative Procedures,
No. 25,905, Docketed July 13, 1989 [hereinafter ALPA Comments].
67 Id. at 3-7. ALPA argued that there was no "rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made" citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 168 (1962). Id. ALPA argued by analogy to Whalen v. Volpe, 348 F. Supp.
1235, 1239 (D. Minn. 1972) vacated, 379 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Minn. 1973), that there
was no rational basis for concluding a correlation existed between a driving under
the influence conviction of a private automobile and a pilot's future habits while
piloting an aircraft. See ALPA Comments, supra note 69, at 3-7.
- ALPA Comments, supra note 66, at 3-7.
69 Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
70 See Pub. L. No. 100-223, 101 Stat. 1525 (1987) ("Any individual who has
applied for or received an airman's certificate may request the chief driver licens-
ing official of a State to transmit information regarding the individual . . .to the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration."). Id. at 1526.
7' The ALPA comments conclude: "Accordingly, the FAA lacks the statutory
authority for its 'required consent' provision." ALPA Comments, supra note 69, at
8.
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G. The Agency's Issuance of Its Final Rule Implementing a
New Medical Application Form
On August 1, 1990, the FAA issued its Final Rule.
The Final Rule consisted of 10 pages, the first 9 of which
discussed its regulatory history and disposed of public
comments.73
As part of its discussion concerning the regulatory his-
tory, the Agency said of the NPRM, which preceded the
Final Rule, as follows: "This NPRM was issued in part to
respond to the results of an audit of the FAA's Airman
Medical Certification Program by the Office of the Inspec-
tor General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT) released on February 17, 1987." 74
After observing that the DOT audit of FAA records dis-
closed that 10,300 of the then 711,648 active airmen had
suffered a suspension or revocation of their driver's
licenses based upon "driving under the influence" of-
fenses, and that 7,850 pilots had failed to report these
convictions to the FAA, the Agency concluded that 76%
of the DUI-convicted pilot population had "failed to re-
port these motor vehicle convictions to the FAA on their
medical applications. 7 5 The FAA characterized airmens'
failure to report their convictions as intentional falsifica-
tions76 and argued its Final Rule was needed to "enhance
safety in air travel." 77
Although the Agency assumed that 76% of the DUI-
72 Pilots Convicted of Alcohol- or Drug-Related Motor Vehicle Offenses or
Subject to State Motor Vehicle Administrative Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,300
(1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.15, 67.3 (1991)) [hereinafter Final Rule].
7- Id. at 31,300-08.
74 Id. at 31,300.
I7 d.
76 Id. The OIG reported the results of the Florida state match and the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) match to the FAA for possible administrative action and to
the DOJ for possible criminal action based on a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001 (sic)
for intentional falsification of an application for a medical certificate. Id.
77 Id. The Rule is intended to enhance safety in air travel and air commerce, and
is necessary to remove from navigable airspace pilots who demonstrate an unwill-
ingness or inability to comply with certain safety regulations and to assist in identi-
fication of personnel who do not meet the medical standards of the regulations.
Id.
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convicted pilot population had intentionally falsified their
medical application forms, no mention was made of the
decision by Judge Carr.78  The Agency's remarks in the
Final Rule made reference to commenters who asserted
that the FAA employed a harsh enforcement policy 79 and
reminded airmen of the criminal penalties for making in-
tentionally false statements. 80 Ironically, however, it an-
nounced the Form was being revised to enhance its clarity
and to enable applicants to provide accurate
information.8
After announcing it was revising the Form to improve
its "clarity," the Agency abandoned its proposed imple-
mentation of § 61.23 because it would have placed the
AME in the position of determining whether an applicant
was complying with the drug abuse program or was meet-
ing obligations imposed by a court. 82 After deleting the
proposed § 61.23(d) which would have made medical cer-
78 See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
7,, Final Rule, supra note 75 at 31,304. Nineteen commenters say that they be-
lieve the FAA has become irrationally harsh in its enforcement policy, that the
FAA has not improved compliance, and that it has damaged its credibility. They
further state that this rule is one more step in this onerous direction. Id.
80 Id. Persons who make false statements on an application for an airman medi-
cal certificate also may be criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1001 [sic], which
carries a fine of not more than $10,000 or a term of imprisonment for up to 5
years, or both. While the FAA refers cases for consideration, the Department of
Justice determines whether to prosecute a person under this statute. Id.
- Id. at 31,305 At this time, the FAA is revising the current form for consis-
tency with the amendment to part 67 as adopted in this final rule. The express
consent provision is added to the form and is placed above the space provided for
the applicant's signature. This provision allows the FAA to receive information
about the applicant that has been reported to the National Driver Register.
Along with the addition of the express consent provision, the agency is taking
the opportunity to incorporate those suggestions it deems will enhance the ap-
pearance and clarity of the form. Changes, in part, include revising the instruc-
tions for filling out the form; increasing the type-size, where possible; moving the
conviction items to a more prominent location within the medical history section;
and updating the portion that deals with penalties for falsification. The agency
believes that these revisions will enable more applicants for the airman medical
certificate to provide the required information accurately and with less effort. Id.
2 Id. at 31,306. In fact, the Agency stated: "Other commenters, themselves
physicians, also expressed grave reservations over this issue. They believe that
the AME would be placed in the unfamiliar role of reviewer and verifier of legal
documents, and would further have to attempt to determine if the sanctions im-
posed had been, or were being, discharged accordingly." Id.
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tificates automatically expire "on the sixty-first day after a
motor vehicle action, '8 3 the Agency announced it was
keeping intact the revisions to § 61.154 and the imple-
mentation of § 67.3 relating to the necessity of the pilot's
executing an authorization giving the FAA access to his
driving records before he could obtain a medical
certificate. 5
In essence, thus, the Final Rule has five components.
First, it defines a "motor vehicle action" as a "conviction"
or a "cancellation, suspension, or revocation of a license
to operate a motor vehicle" or "[t]he denial after Novem-
ber 29, 1990, of an application for a license to operate a
motor vehicle by a state" to the extent those convictions,
cancellations or denials relate to the operation of a motor
vehicle "while intoxicated by alcohol or a drug, while im-
paired by alcohol or a drug, or while under the influence
of alcohol or a drug. "86 The "motor vehicle action" (i.e.,
conviction, cancellation or denial) must occur after No-
vember 29, 1990.87
Secondly, the Final Rule calls for the denial or suspen-
sion or revocation of the certificate of an airman who has
a motor vehicle action occurring within three years of a
previous motor vehicle action.88 Third, rather than re-
quiring the pilot to report his "motor vehicle action" to
the Airman Certification Branch of the FAA, the Final
Rule's provisions are more ominous, since the airman
must report his transgression within sixty days to the
FAA's Security Division. This report must include: (1) the
person's name, address, date of birth and airman's certifi-
cate number; (2) the type of violation that resulted in the
conviction or the administrative action; (3) the date of the
conviction or administrative action; (4) the state that
holds the record of conviction or administrative action;
,3 54 Fed. Reg. 21,580, 21,585 (1989).
14 Final Rule, supra note 72, at 31,307.
I d.
"; Id. (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(c)(l)-(3) (1991)).
.7 Id.
I- d. (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(d)(l)-(2) (1991)).
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and (5) a statement of whether the motor vehicle action
resulted from the same incident or arose out of the same
factual circumstances relating to a previously-reported
motor vehicle action."' 9
Fourth, the Final Rule provides that any airman who re-
ports his "motor vehicle actions" to the FAA within sixty
days may suffer a suspension, revocation or denial of any
rating held by him based upon his action of non-compli-
ance.9° The fifth and final aspect of the Final Rule re-
quires that the airman, before obtaining a medical
certificate, give the FAA access to any records on file with
the National Driver Register. 9'
Although a petition for review challenging provisions in
the Final Rule could have been filed with an appropriate
United States Circuit Court of Appeals no later than Oc-
tober 1, 1990, no action was taken by any airman or avia-
tion organization.9 2
III. THE ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE AND
DEFENSES
A. Preliminary Observations
Counsel who undertakes the representation of an air-
man in a case involving alleged false entries on the Form
should be alert to the prospect that the case may be pro-
ceeding on parallel tracks, i.e., (1) a criminal investigation
Id. at 31,309 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(e)(1)-(5) (1991)).
90 Id. (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(0(1)-(5) (1991)).
I, d. (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 67.3 (1991)).
1.2 See 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1988) (authorizing the filing of a petition for review
with a United States Circuit Court of Appeals and/or with the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia within sixty days of the entry of an order
by the Secretary of Transportation). See also Letter from Alan Armstrong to J.L.
Baker, President, AOPA, (Aug. 30, 1990) (suggesting that the Final Rule could be
challenged (1) on the theory there is no rational basis to support the FAA's asser-
tion that driving under the influence charges are related to FAA safety regulations
or medical standards and (2) on the theory that the FAA exceeded its authority by
requiring airmen to consent to the FAA's accessing their driving records as a con-
dition to obtaining a medical certificate) (on file with the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce).
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by DOJ and (2) an administrative investigation by the
FAA.
Further, the criminal considerations notwithstanding,
there has been a common practice among investigators at-
tached to the OIG to "interview" airmen without giving
them any Miranda 93 -type warnings.94 Accordingly, the
fact that the Inspector is from the OIG and does not give
the airman any Miranda-type warnings should not be
viewed as an indication that the case only relates to an
administrative (FAA enforcement) action.
Assuming, in retrospect, that the information related by
the pilot was false or incomplete, the ability of the prose-
cution to prevail may well hinge on its ability to show that
airman knowingly gave false information or acted with the
intent to deceive a Government officer. With reference to
the issue of the airman's state of mind, he may testify (1)
that he did not understand the import of the vague ques-
tions on the Form, (2) that even appreciating the import
of the questions on the Form, his admittedly false answers
were unintentional, or (3) that the Form, statute or regu-
lation upon which the prosecution is premised is vague.
Besides giving testimony about his lack of any "intent" to
give false information or to deceive a government officer,
an airman may attempt to prevail by arguing the inforna-
tion he withheld or misrepresented was immaterial, i.e.,
that it would not tend to affect the decision of the Agency
to issue a medical certificate.
93 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-474 (1966). (Miranda holds that a
suspect undergoing interrogation should be told: (1) that he has the right to re-
main silent; (2) that anything he says can and will be used against him in court; (3)
that he has the right to consult with counsel before questioning and also to have
counsel present during any questioning if he so desires; (4) that if he is indigent, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him; and (5) if he indicates a desire to speak
with counsel before speaking with the police, they must respect his decision to
remain silent). Id.
"1 See Letter from Rj. DeCarli, Acting Deputy Inspector General, Department
of Transportation, to Alan Armstrong (Mar. 7, 1990) (on file with the Journal of Air
Law and Commerce).
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B. Fraud Versus an Intentionally False Statement
Pertinent provisions found in the United States Code9 5
and the Federal Air Regulations (FARs) 96 require conduct
of an intentional, fraudulent or knowing nature in relation
to the alleged false statement.9 7 Under the federal false
statement statute,98 criminal liability is imposed if the in-
dividual "(1) makes a statement that (2) was false, (3) was
material, (4) was made knowingly and willfully, and (5)
was made in a matter 'within the jurisdiction of any de-
partment or agency of the United States.' -9 The five ele-
ments of fraud consist of (1) a false representation, (2) in
reference to a material fact, (3) made with knowledge of
its falsity, (4) with the intent to deceive, and (5) with ac-
tion taken in reliance upon the representation.'
There are three elements to a claim concerning an al-
leged false statement, namely (1) falsity, (2) materiality,
and (3) knowledge.°'0 While the giving of an intentionally
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
14 C.F.R. § 67.20(a)(1), (2) (1991).
,37 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). This provision provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up
by any trick, scheme or device a material fact or makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or
uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
Id. See also 14 C.F.R. § 67.20 (1990). This resolution provides:
(a) No person shall make or cause to be made - (1) any fraudulent
or intentionally false statement on any application for a medical cer-
tificate under this part; (2) any fraudulent or intentionally false en-
try in any logbook, record, or report that is required to be kept,
made or used to show compliance with any requirement for any
medical certificate under this part . . .(b) The commission by any
person of an act prohibited under paragraph (a) of this section is a
basis for suspending or revoking any airman, ground instructor, or
medical certificate or rating held by that person.
Id.
98 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
im Id. See also United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 1983); see
also United States v. Seay, 718 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 49 (2nd Cir. 1983).
Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 338 (1942).
Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976).
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false statement is a lesser included offense within fraud,
fraud requires at least one additional element, an intent to
deceive. 10 2 Moreover, even in administrative proceed-
ings, the scienter requirements of administrative regula-
tions are not to be ignored where the clear import of the
regulation is to prohibit "intentional wrongdoing."'
C. Defenses Relating to an Absence of any Fraudulent or
Intentionally False Statement
1. The Form's Ambiguities
Recognizing that the airman's alleged intentional or
fraudulent state of mind is at the heart of the prosecu-
tion's case, either in the context of criminal or administra-
tive proceedings, it would appear incumbent upon the
prosecution to demonstrate the import of the Form was
clearly understood by the airman. Presently, the Form
contains no meaningful instructions, and simply lists
questions relating to "record of traffic convictions" or
"record of other convictions" under the "Medical His-
tory" portion of the Form instructing the airman to "de-
scribe condition in REMARKS."' 0 4
The Form has been criticized to the extent "no instruc-
tions are available," and "Itihe terms are not self-defin-
ing. '"105 Additionally, the Federal Air Surgeon has
admitted that "some persons consider the questions re-
garding convictions in the medical history portion of the
form to be vague or ambiguous."' 0 6 Moreover, since the
102 Id.
, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). "When a statute speaks
so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of implementing de-
vices and contrivances - the commonly understood terminology of intentional
wrong doing - and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are
quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct." Id. at
214.
-o See United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097, 1101 (11 th Cir. 1991).
,05 Letter from Bernard A. Geier, Executive Director of the National Associa-
tion of Flight Instructors, to Robert R. McMeekin, M.D., Federal Air Surgeon
(Feb. 6, 1990) [hereinafter Geier letter] (on file with the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce).
o Letter from Robert R. McMeekin, M.D., Federal Air Surgeon, to Bernard A.
3751991]
376 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
Form only calls for an affirmative response in the event
the airman has multiple convictions, airmen could have
reasonably understood the question as calling for an af-
firmative response only if more than one traffic conviction
or other conviction was involved.' 0 7
In light of these patent ambiguities in the Form, it is not
surprising that Manapat argued in her motion to dismiss
that "[t]he juxtaposition of a request for information re-
garding convictions with medical conditions is inherently
ambiguous."'' 08 Further, she also argued that "[i]f a ques-
tion is excessively vague or fundamentally ambiguous, the
answer to such a question may not, as a matter of law,
form the basis of a perjury or false statement prosecu-
tion."' 0 9 Manapat concluded her argument by observing
that an "applicant is left to wonder what is required to
satisfy the FAA."" Judge Carr ruled accordingly.
Furthermore, Judge Carr was mindful of the Broderick
Memorandum in rendering his decision, having read a
portion of same into the record before making his rul-
ing. 11 Judge Carr further remarked that criminal prose-
Geier, Executive Director, National Association of Flight Instructors (March 1,
1990) [hereinafter Federal Air Surgeon's letter] (on file with the Journal of Air Law
and Commerce).
,07 See Geier letter, supra note 105.
Ol Motion to Dismiss, at 5, United States v. Manapat, No. 88-00325-CR-T-
13(A) (M.D. Fla. 1988) (filed Nov. 2, 1988).
109 Id.
- Id. at 6.
" United States v. Manapat, No. 88-00325-CR-T-13A, slip. op. at 3-4 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 8, 1988)), aff'd 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1991). Judge Carr said:
Also, last week a defendant routinely appeared before the court on a
similar charge based on this same form to enter a plea of guilty pur-
suant to Rule 11. In the Rule 11 colloquy, as the court inquired into
the matter, [it] learned that the defendant made the claim that he
didn't willfully give false answers on this form; and the court could
not accept the plea, even though he wanted to enter the plea for
convenience sake. And this is the danger that this creates. And, in
addition the Court learned in this trial, as I mentioned, about a
memo [Broderick Memorandum] dated February the seventeenth,
1987, from the Federal Aviation Administration. It is from the Asso-
ciate Administrator of Aviation Standards to the Assistant Inspector
General for Investigation [sic] in which, among other things, there is
a paragraph which I would like to quote for the record, which it
states:
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cutions based on the Form were "a danger to basic
justice."'"t 2 The Court concluded its remarks by saying
that if the FAA wanted to know about airmens' driving
records, it should revise the Form and ask specific ques-
tions in that regard."t 3
The most intriguing aspect of the Manapat decision is
that it eliminates the prospect of putting the client "in
jeopardy" on the theory that the prosecution cannot es-
tablish its case as a matter of law. "[I]t is not up to the jury
as to whether the defendant understood the question or,
more properly, how the defendant understood the ques-
tion, but rather, it is up to the Court to decide whether the
question is excessively vague or ambiguous and that it
cannot be the proper basis for a false statement
prosecution."" 14
Counsel who proceed to trial without attacking the pat-
We also need to think about changing the form in substance of
the questions asked in form 8350-8 [sic] as we discussed; that is
the form that I have been talking about. It has not generally
been possible to successfully prosecute people in the past, in
part because of the vague, qualitative and evaluative nature of
these questions. As you will know, dozens of such cases were
returned to us and [sic] declined for prosecution a few years
ago. We would be pleased to receive any suggestions you have
for improvement in this area.
Id.
Id. at 4.
" Id. at 4-5. Judge Carr stated:
Now, having said that, I would like to make it clear that the court
does not quarrel with the FAA's need for the type of information
that they are apparently wanting to get in this area. It is important
that the FAA know of anyone who wants to fly airplanes in our skies
and wants a pilot [sic] license to know whether these applicants have
been convicted of drug offenses or alcohol-related offenses; and
they are entitled to it, to have that information. And if they properly
ask that question of an applicant, they are entitled to truthful an-
swers; and if they don't get truthful answers, then that person is lia-
ble for prosecution. But the basic premise is that they need to ask
these questions in a direct and concise and clear way so that there is
not this chance of confusion; and, at least, that's what this court
thinks.
Id.
114 Brief for Appellees at 18-19, United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11 th
Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3rd Cir. 1987)) (on
file at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
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ent "ambiguities" in the Form may be placing his client at
unnecessary risk. Accordingly, the prosecution should be
confronted with the Agency's admissions in the Broderick
Memorandum well before trial. A motion to dismiss the
charges based on substantive due process deficiencies in
the Form should be filed and pursued vigorously. FAA
personnel acquainted with the Form's deficiencies should
be placed under subpoena and should be required to ac-
knowledge the FAA's awareness of the vague nature of
the questions on the Form before the prosecution
brought charges against the airman.
2. The Inadvertence Defense
The airman's "state of mind" at the time he completed
the form is a pivotal issue if the prosecution is to prevail.
Therefore, it is possible for the airman to successfully
concede making a false statement without having done so
"intentionally."" 15 Accordingly, even if the trial court de-
clines to rule as a matter of law that statements made to
questions on the Form cannot be the basis for a fraud or
false statement prosecution, it is possible to persuade the
finder of fact that the statements were not intentionally
false. In Hart v. McLucas, 1 6 an instructor was charged
with making "fraudulent or intentionally false state-
ment(s)" in his student's flight logbooks. 1 7 The record
demonstrated that the flight instructor was physically sick
and admittedly overworked and certified the incorrect en-
11 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (requiring proof from the prosecution that
the airman acted "knowingly and willfully"); 14 C.F.R. § 67.20(a)(l)-(2) (1991)
(requiring proof that the airman made a "fraudulent or intentionally false"
statement).
1c 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1976).
117 Id. at 518. The instructor in Hart was charged with violating 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.59(a)(2) which prohibited "[a]ny fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any
logbook, record, or report that is required to be kept, made, or used, to show
compliance with any requirement for the issuance, or exercise of the privileges, or
any certificate or rating .. " Id. The elements of intentional misconduct, i.e.,
that the airman acted either fraudulently or intentionally are the same in 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.59(a)(2) as those found in the regulation forbidding the provision of "fraud-
ulent or intentionally false statement(s) on any application for a medical certificate
... 14 C.F.R. § 67.20(a)(1) (1991).
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tries without first checking his own records. ' 8 Moreover,
he freely admitted the statements in question were
false." 9 The Administrative Law Judge before whom the
case was tried found that the instructor's actions were
"more consistent with inattention than with an outright
attempt to defraud anyone."'' 20 Noting the instructor's
actions were the result of "inattention," the Judge ruled
that although the instructor had not acted "fraudulently,"
he had made " 'intentionally false' statements within the
meaning of C.F.R. § 61.59(a)(2)" and revoked his certifi-
cate.12' The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) affirmed the Judge's findings, but decided instead
to suspend Hart's license for nine months. 22
Hart filed a Petition for Review with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the
Agency had prevailed in his case based upon an applica-
tion by the NTSB of a standard of "strict liability."' 2 3 The
Agency responded that "knowledge of falsity is not a re-
quired element for [an] intentional false statement."' 2 4
The Ninth Circuit rejected the "strict liability" position
advanced by the FAA and reversed the NTSB's decision,
holding:
[T]he administrative interpretation of § 61.59(a)(2) ad-
vanced below, which essentially establishes a strict liability
offense, is incorrect since it violates the common and nor-
mal meaning of the phrase 'intentionally false.' A fair
reading of § 61.59(a)(2) indicates a desire to require scien-
ter, i.e., knowledge of falsity, for liability. If the FAA
thinks it would be better to establish strict liability, it is
free to seek amendment of the regulation. 125
In light of the Ninth Circuit's holding, it remanded Hart's





123 Id. at 519.
124 Id.
,'2 Id. at 520.
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case to the NTSB for a determination concerning his state
of mind "at the time he entered the false statements into
his students' logbooks.' t26
In Administrator v. Hart,2 7 the proceedings remanded to
the NTSB by the Ninth Circuit were initially dismissed. 2 8
The Agency then petitioned for reconsideration, 129 and
the NTSB allowed both parties to file briefs on the issue
of Hart's state of mind at the time the admittedly false
entries were made.13 0 Hart's brief argued that the factual
findings made by the judge were "consistent with inatten-
tion"'' by reason of which he could not be found to have
acted intentionally. The FAA argued that Hart's state of
mind "in a fraud case ... (includes) reckless disregard for
truth or falsity."'' 32  Confronted with the Judge's finding
in the record that Hart's actions were "consistent with in-
attention," the NTSB again dismissed the FAA's com-
plaint and terminated the proceedings, finding there was
no evidence in the record that Hart knew the entries in
the logbooks were false when he made them. 33
In dismissing the Agency's complaint, the NTSB made
the following observation: "We agree with the Adminis-
trator that it is almost impossible to establish a past state
of mind of another person, particularly when he dis-
agrees. But, in accordance with the court's decision in
this case, we think that circumstantial evidence on that is-
sue must be so compelling that no other determination is
reasonably possible." 134
In Administrator v. Juliao,135 the airman had a conviction
126 Id. at 521.
127 3 N.T.S.B. 24 (1977).
128 Id. The NTSB dismissed the Agency's complaint and terminated the pro-
ceedings on August 16, 1976. Id.
- Id. The Agency's Petition for Reconsideration was granted on October 21,
1976. Id.
1 Id.
,, Id. at 25.
132 Id.
33 Id. at 26.
134 Id.
i- N.T.S.B. No. EA-3087, 1990 N.T.S.B. LEXIS 36 (Mar. 1, 1990).
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of currency-export violations in connection with his at-
tempt to deposit $100,000 in Columbia. Juliao failed to
disclose the conviction in his medical application form.
Juliao testified he merely checked all the "no" boxes on
the Form because he had no medical problems. The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge found Juliao had made a "fraudu-
lent or intentionally false statement"'' 36 in violation of
Federal Air Regulation § 67.20(a)(1).13 7 In making his
finding, the Judge observed: "I don't think its an accepta-
ble defense that he later claims that, well, he didn't read
what he clearly checked off and signed, so there is inten-
tional falsity I find."' 38
The NTSB reversed the Judge's ruling, observing that
"[ilt is not enough, under the regulation, to show what a
respondent should have known. Rather, the proof, either
directly or circumstantially, must show what he knew."' 39
Accordingly, Juliao's case was remanded for further con-
sideration of his inadvertence defense. 40
Juliao is troublesome to the extent it indicates the Board
approves of the Form being used to determine the pilot's
"moral fitness" for flight. Although (1) multiple driving
while intoxicated convictions may evidence alcoholism,
(2) drug convictions may evidence drug dependency and
(3) an extensive criminal record may evidence personality
disorders,' 4' Juliao demonstrates that airmen are being
prosecuted based on an ostensible medical form, for fail-
ing to disclose "convictions" which cannot be described
as "medical conditions." Although Juliao, as the holder
of an airline transport certificate, was required to "[b]e of
good moral character,"' 4 2 one could argue the juxtaposi-
tion of terms on the Form was fundamentally unfair. Ju-
IS6 Id.
137 14 C.F.R. § 67.20(a)(1) (1991).
- N.T.S.B. No. EA-3087, 1990 N.T.S.B. LEXIS 36, at * 5.
,- id. at *6.
140 Id. at *7.
14, Alcoholism, drug dependency, and psychosis are medically disqualifying
conditions. 14 C.F.R. § 67.13(d)(l)(i)(b)-(d) (1991).
142 14 C.F.R. § 61.151(b) (1991).
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liao indicates that an airline captain convicted of income
tax evasion could suffer a revocation of all his airman cer-
tificates based upon failing to report his conviction as a
medical condition on the Form.
Furthermore, the potential for confusion by the FAA's
placing "convictions" under the "Medical History" cap-
tion on the Form was discussed over twenty years ago
when the Board made the following observations in Ad-
ministrator v. LeBlanc:143
Placing entries concerning convictions under a general
heading "Medical History" might cause a person who has
no history of medical problems and who is filling out the
Form hastily, to mark 'no' automatically to all entries with-
out reading each one separately. We also agree for pur-
poses of clarity, the entry concerning convictions could be
more appropriately located on the form under a separate
heading. 144
3. Attacking the Regulation or Statute as Vague
Although Judge Carr's decision in Manapat suggests
there is some prospect for successfully attacking the Form
as being ambiguous or vague, an attack on a regulation
concerning "any fraudulent or intentionally false state-
ment" has been rejected. In Cassis v. Helms,145 an appli-
cant for an Airline Transport Certificate had 1,500
legitimate flight hours and also had "false entries for an
additional 150 hours of flight time."'' 46 Cassis testified he
made the false statements in his logbook "in order to en-
hance his employment prospects."'' 47 Because the legiti-
mate entries by Cassis satisfied the applicable flight hour
requirement, 48 the Administrative Law Judge found (1)
143 1 N.T.S.B. 974 (1970).
144 Id. at 976.
14., 737 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1984).
146 Id. at 546.
147 Id.
- 14 C.F.R. § 61.155(b)(2) (1991) (requires an applicant for an Airline Trans-
port Certificate to demonstrate that he has accumulated 1,500 hours of flight
experience).
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that the false entries were not material, (2) that the false
entries had not been made with the intent to deceive, and
(3) that the false entries had not been relied upon by the
FAA.' 4 9 Accordingly, the Judge concluded that Cassis had
not violated § 61.59(a)(2). 50
The FAA appealed the Judge's ruling in favor of Cassis,
and the NTSB reversed the decision of the Judge and af-
firmed the revocation of Cassis' license.' 5' Cassis peti-
tioned for review before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit arguing (1) that his false
statements were immaterial and (2) that § 61.59(a)(2) was
unconstitutionally vague. 52 Noting that Cassis admitted
"that he knowingly made false statements in his log-
book," 15 3 the Sixth Circuit found the materiality issue was
satisfied since "the false statements had the natural ten-
dency to influence, or were capable of influencing, the de-
cision of the FAA inspector to whom the logbook was
submitted."'' 5 4 With reference to Cassis' attack on the
regulation as being "unconstitutionally vague, ' 155 the
Sixth Circuit said:
"The plain language of the regulation clearly informs per-
sons of the proscription against making fraudulent or in-
tentionally false statements in pilot logbooks. The
regulation certainly is not 'so vague that a person exercis-
ing common sense could not sufficiently understand and
fulfill its prescription.' [Cits.] That courts have grafted
onto § 61.59(a)(2) a requirement that misrepresentations
be material does not render the provision vague. Indeed,
the materiality requirement benefits persons like Cassis
because the requirement limits the otherwise permissible
reach of the regulation. ' 56





'.4 Id. at 547. The Sixth Circuit cited Poulos v. United States, 387 F.2d 4 (10th
Cir. 1968). See infra notes 169-183 and accompanying text.
1w, Cassis, 737 F.2d at 547.
wm, Id.
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Accordingly, while constitutional attacks on the Form may
prevail, the court rejected an attack on the regulation or
statute as "unconstitutionally vague."
D. Defenses Relating to the Materiality of the Withheld or
False Information
As noted above, a prima facia case, either of fraud or
false statements, requires proof concerning the material-
ity of the withheld or false information. 5 7 With the possi-
ble exception of the ruling in Manapat, attacks on the.
"materiality" of the withheld or falsified matter have not
been successful. Manapat argued that if the applicant met
the "vision, hearing, mental and neurological, cardiovas-
cular and general medical requirements . . .she must be
given a certificate; hence, the FAA's decision in the certifi-
cation process is not discretionary."' 58 Although Judge
Carr sustained Manapat's Motion to Dismiss, 5 9 he did so
after his pronouncement from the bench on December 8,
1988, that the Agency had a legitimate interest in knowing
"whether these applicants have been convicted of drug of-
fenses or alcohol-related offenses."'' 60  Accordingly,
Manapat's argument that the withheld information was
immaterial appears to have been unpersuasive to Judge
Carr.
In Poulos v. United States,' 6' the appellant was convicted
on two counts of falsifying medical forms, receiving con-
current sentences of four years. 62 Poulos had 13 felony
157 See supra notes 108-225 and accompanying text.
,5, Motion to Dismiss at 3-4, United States v. Manapat, No. 88-00325-CR-T-
13(A) (M.D. Fla. 1988) (filed Nov. 2, 1988) (on file at the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce). In this motion, Manapat argues that she met the medical requirements
of 14 C.F.R. § 67.17 (1990) and cites 14 C.F.R. § 67.11 (1990) and Beins v.
United States, 695 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1982) for the proposition that the Agency's
discretion as to whether to issue an applicant a medical certificate was limited to
her physiological and neurological qualifications.
1-19 United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097, 1099 (11th Cir. 1991).
- Record at 4, Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (No. 88-4029).
- 387 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968).
162 Id.
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convictions and several convictions for misdemeanors. 163
During the course of his flight training, he went to an
AME to obtain a medical certificate. The physician re-
fused to examine him "by reason of his extensive criminal
record." '64
Poulos then went to his flight instructor, who called an
FAA employee. His instructor was told "that this would
make no difference."' 165 Poulos then went to see other
AMEs, and his criminal record was discussed prior to the
examinations in issue. 66 On the two occasions when
Poulos completed an application, he checked "yes" with
reference to the boxes pertaining to "record of traffic con-
victions" and "record of other convictions.' 67 In the
"remarks" portion of the Form, he listed a grand larceny
convictions, several motor vehicle citations and a jaywalk-
ing citation. 68
After Poulos' application was submitted to the FAA, the
Agency learned of other criminal convictions "and re-
turned the Form for further data, indicating by
checkmarks the areas where the additional data should be
furnished."'' 69 Poulos made some minor additions to the
Form, such as "on appeal" and had his lawyer return the
Form to the FAA.' 70 Following submission of this addi-
tional data, the FAA requested that Poulos submit to a
psychiatric examination. 7 1
At trial, the Agency's flight surgeon testified that he had
told Poulos "there was a serious question as to whether or
not he could meet the FAA regulations and requested
Poulos to surrender the medical certificate Poulos then
had in his possession."72On appeal, Poulos unsuccess-









172 Id. at 6.
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fully argued that the withheld information was immaterial.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the withheld
information has "the natural tendency to influence or was
capable of influencing the decision of the officer or agent
to whom it was submitted."'' 73
Besides attacking the materiality of the withheld infor-
mation, Poulos challenged the Form itself on due process
grounds, claiming that the Form was too vague, to the ex-
tent his record of convictions could not be described as a
medical condition. 174 The Tenth Circuit rejected this ar-
gument but left the door open to a future challenge ob-
serving that Poulos' due process argument "could have
some merit were it not for the fact that the appellant from
the outset of his flight training had been made aware of
the problem of his felony convictions in connection with
his medical examinations." 75
The Agency apparently recognized that the prosecu-
tion's ability to prevail in the Poulos case was predicated
upon the Tenth Circuit's finding that Poulos had been
made aware of the importance of his felony convictions as
related to his medical examinations.176 It appears that the
numerous notices published by the Agency in the Federal
Register concerning its enforcement policy, as well as the
creation of the "Amnesty Program," were attempts to bol-
ster the otherwise constitutionally deficient Form and
make pilots aware of the importance (materiality) of their





177 See, e.g., Administrator v. Dolph, No. EA-3031, 1989 N.T.S.B. LEXIS 176
(Nov. 16, 1989). In Dolph, the airman, after being involved in an aircraft accident
in September of 1986, failed to disclose on his medical applications in January and
March of 1987, his involvement in an aircraft accident resulting in 5 days' hospi-
talization where the facial bones (orbital floors) beneath both eyes were recon-
structed. The FAA flight surgeon wrote the airman requesting additional
information on his medical status but the airman did not respond. Based on this
strong circumstantial evidence, the NTSB Administrator found that the airman
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E. The Potential Impact of a Revised Medical Form
The FAA's revised Form currently marked "draft" con-
tains two pages of instructions, including certain ques-
tions the Agency asks relative to the applicant's
"conviction" and/or administrative action history.7M To
knowingly gave false responses on the Form and revoked not only his medical
certificate, but also his airman's certificate. Id. at *4-5.
Besides the results in Manapat and Poulos, other cases generally suggest that an
attack on the "materiality" of the withheld data may be problematic. See Twomey
v. NTSB, 821 F.2d 63, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1987) (falsification with respect to the date
on which the medical certificate application was completed declared material to
the extent the pilot could use the back-dated certificate to persuade his employer
and the FAA that he possessed an appropriate medical certificate when he con-
ducted certain flights for his employer when, in fact, his first class privileges had
expired). It appears the materiality element in Twomey was improperly expanded
in the context of allegedly violating 14 C.F.R. § 67.20(a)(1)(1991), since the date
discrepancy on the pilot's medical application could not have affected nor had the
tendency to affect the Agency's assessment of his medical qualifications. The fact
that the pilot attempted to deceive his employer and the FAA concerning whether
he was in possession of a first class medical certificate during specified flights,
although possibly affording another basis for prosecution, was immaterial to his
medical qualifications. See also United States v. Norberg, 612 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1979) (conviction for providing materially false statements to a bank affirmed
since the information had "the capacity to influence" the bank) (citing Poulos, 387
F.2d at 6); United States v. Wolf, 645 F.2d 23, 24-25 (10th Cir. 1981) (affirming
conviction for making a false statement, i.e., "that the oil sold was 'stripper crude'
when in fact it was fuel oil, a refined product," the Tenth Circuit held the informa-
tion was material because it "(had) the natural tendency to influence or was capa-
ble of influencing the decision of the officer or agent to whom it was submitted")
(citations omitted); Niolet, 3 N.T.S.B. 2846, 2849-2850 (1980) (false logbook en-
tries with respect to the total number of flight hours the pilot had accumulated
were held material by Judge John Faulk, and the NTSB affirmed a revocation of
the airman's commercial pilot certificate).
118 See Proposed FAA Medical Application Form (on file with Journal of Air Law
and Commerce [hereinafter Draft]. The instructions direct the applicant to disclose
whether or not he has been
(1) convicted, paid a fine or forfeited bond or collateral; (2) subject
to an administrative action of a state or other jurisdiction where your
license was denied, suspended or revoked, or (3) subject to an ad-
ministrative action of a state or other jurisdiction where you were
required to perform a service or attend a remedial rehabilitative as
the result of a moving traffic violation. Each item must be checked
either 'yes' or 'no'. For all items checked 'yes', a description of the
conviction(s) and/or administrative action(s) must be given in the
EXPLANATIONS box. This description must include: (1) the of-
fense for which you were convicted and/or the administrative action
taken, e.g., attendance at an alcohol treatment program in lieu of
conviction, license denial, suspension or revocation for refusal to be
tested, etc.; (2) the state or other jurisdiction involved; and (3) the
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the extent the Form has been criticized for containing
terms that were not "self-defining,"'' 79 or for seeking an
affirmative response if only multiple convictions were in-
volved, 10 the instructions on the Draft appear to conform
to the observations made by Judge Carr from the
bench.'"' To the extent the Draft contains explicit in-
structions about the specific data sought by the Agency,
an airman's testimony that he did not appreciate or un-
derstand the import of the questions may be less believ-
able. Arguably, however, an ambiguity exists between the
Draft and the revisions to Federal Air Regulation
§ 61.15.182
Moreover, recognizing that regulations have been put
in place requiring that airmen report their motor vehicle
actions to FAA Security and allowing the Agency to access
airmens' driving history diminishes the prospects of pilots
withholding or failing to disclose their records of traffic
convictions.
An applicant charged with falsifying or providing fraud-
ulent data on the Draft or a substantially similar form may
still assert the following factual arguments: (1) that he in-
advertently omitted the data; (2) that he did not under-
stand the import of the question (if it relates to a non-
traffic offense situation); and (3) that he misapprehended
date of the conviction and/or administrative action. The FAA may
check state motor vehicles drivers licensing records to verify your
responses. Letter (w) of this subheading asks if you have ever had
any non-traffic convictions, (e.g., assault, battery, public intoxica-
tion, robbery, etc.). If so, name the charge for which you were con-
victed and the date of conviction in the EXPLANATIONS box. See
Note above.
Id.
d179 See Geier letter, supra note 105, at 1.
1"o Id.
18, See Transcript of Proceedings at 4, United States v. Manapat, No. 88-00325-
CR-T-13 (A) (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 1988). "And if they properly ask that question of
an applicant, (i.e., whether he has drug offenses or alcohol-related offenses), they
are entitled to truthful answers . I..." d.
182 The Draft's instructions ask if the airman has "ever been ... subject to an
administrative action ...as the result of a moving traffic violation," while 14
C.F.R. § 61.15(c)(1)-(3) all relate to motor vehicle actions "after November 29,
1990." Draft, supra note 178, at 1; 14 C.FR. § 61.15(c) (3)(1991).
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the importance (materiality) of a question, thereby lead-
ing to confusion on his part and negating the prosecu-
tion's assertion that he acted intentionally or knowingly.
Moreover, a motion to dismiss and/or a motion for judg-
ment of acquittal may still be advanced to the extent: (1)
the FAA was on notice with respect to the data not dis-
closed on the application, (2) the withheld data is immate-
rial (i.e., is unrelated to the pilot's medical qualifications),
and/or (3) the prosecution's basis for employing the ap-
plication is fundamentally unfair.
F. Other Problems in Medical Form Litigation
In addition to the matters discussed above, counsel
should be sensitive to other problems which may arise in
litigation related to the Form. One problem relates to the
possibility that the airman's AME has been indoctrinated
in terms of the physician's duty to report the pilot's
problems to the FAA. Although it may generally be desir-
able for an AME to call a serious problem to the attention
of the Agency, potential for abuse exists in the current
climate. For example in Administrator v. Carroll,'8 3 the air-
man, on the advice of a marriage counselor he and his
wife were seeing, went to an AME who was a Board-certi-
fied physician in psychiatry and in addiction medicine. 8 4
After a 15-minute interview, it was the AME's assessment
that the pilot was an alcoholic. Accordingly, the physician
gave him one of two alternatives: (1) either enter (the
AME's) 21-day, $20,000, program of treatment or (2) he
"would report (the pilot) as an alcoholic to the FAA."' 85
When the pilot declined the physician's invitation to enter
the program, the AME reported the pilot. The FAA is-
sued an emergency order revoking his airman's certifi-
cate. ' 6 It is noteworthy that the airman had flown as a
military helicopter pilot for 20 years, had served two tours
NTSB No. EA-2952 (June 16, 1989).
-4 Id. at 7.
-5 Id. at 11.
1"80 Id. at 1.
1991] 389
390 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
of duty in Vietnam, had 25 air medals, including Presiden-
tial citations, and had never been accused of having an
excessive drinking habit.' 87 At trial, Judge Mullins found
that a 15-minute interview failed to demonstrate any basis
for the charges and reversed the Agency's emergency or-
der of revocation. 88 Judge Mullins' ruling was affirmed
by the NTSB on appeal. 8 9
To the extent an airman has one or more convictions
relating to illegal drugs, must the convictions be "final"?
If the convictions are not final, to what extent is the air-
man obligated to give mitigating testimony in the NTSB
proceedings if it is also incriminating in terms of criminal
proceedings then on appeal? These issues were ad-
dressed in Administrator v. Hernandez.' 90 Hernandez had
three convictions relating to illegal drugs, two of which
were on appeal.' 9' Based upon his record of drug convic-
tions, the Agency sought a revocation of his commercial
pilot certificate. 92
Judge Geraghty granted summary judgment to the
Agency after it submitted exhibits proving the convictions
suffered by Hernandez193 and affirmed the Agency's order
of revocation. 94  On appeal, Hernandez argued that the
Agency had not demonstrated that his convictions were
final' 95 and that the absence of any finality in the criminal
cases prohibited his giving testimony in mitigation of
187 Id. at 6-7.
18 Id. at 1.
,-9 Id. at 18.
- NTSB No. EA-3164 (July 5, 1990).
I9, d. at 3-4. Hernandez had a Petition for Certiorari pending before the
United States Supreme Court and another case on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.
'92 Id. at 1. The FAA's charges were premised on 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(a)(2)
(1991). Id. This regulation authorizes the suspension or revocation of any certifi-
cate of an airman who had suffered a conviction "for the violation of any federal
or state statute relating to the growing, processing, manufacture, sale, disposition,
possession, transportation, or importation of narcotic drugs, marijuana, or de-
pressant or stimulant drugs or substances." 14 C.F.R. § 61.5(a)(2)(1991).
,95 Order Granting Summary Judgment, Administrator v. Hernandez, NTSB
No. EA 4-3164 (July 5, 1990).
'- Decisional Order of Termination, Administrator v. Hernandez, NTSB No.
EA-3164 (July 5, 1990).
I Hernandez, NTSB No. EA-3164, at 2.
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sanction in the administrative proceedings based upon
the protection against self-incrimination. 96 Because both
parties to the proceeding argued the case as though "fi-
nality" was essential to the FAA's case, the NTSB made
that assumption in its ruling which remanded the case to
Judge Geraghty for further proceedings in order to pro-
vide Hernandez "the opportunity to offer evidence in mit-
igation of the decision to revoke."' 197
Does an airman who fails to provide information in re-
sponse to a request from a regional flight surgeon with
respect to questions on a medical application have a duty
to disclose that information in response to questions ap-
pearing on a subsequent medical application after the
Agency is aware of the information previously withheld by
the airman? Administrator v. Shrader appears to stand for
the proposition that there is no duty to voluntarily dis-
close the information after the Agency is on notice con-
cerning the nature of the withheld information.' 9" In
Shrader, the airman was arrested on three occasions for
driving while intoxicated and suffered two convictions as a
consequence of those arrests. 99 In 1985, the airman flew
an aircraft from Mexico to Texas with marijuana aboard,
but did not suffer a conviction until 1987.
After the marijuana flight but before his conviction, the
airman applied for a medical certificate in May of 1986.
The regional flight surgeon requested further information
from the airman in February of 1987 concerning his eligi-
bility for a medical certificate. The airman did not re-
spond to the flight surgeon's request for information but
applied for a medical certificate again in July of 1988, over
two years after the date of the medical certificate in
dispute.
Based on these assertions, the Agency sought a revoca-
tion of both Shrader's airman and medical certificates.
1"- Id.
,197 id. at 5.
ism NTSB No. EA-3018 (Oct. 20, 1989).
' Id. at 3.
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The Agency contended that he made one or more inten-
tionally false statements on the Form by operating "a civil
aircraft within the United States with knowledge that nar-
cotic drugs .. .were carried in the aircraft. ' 20 0 Although
Judge Mullins affirmed an emergency order revoking
Shrader's airman certificate, he determined that an appro-
priate sanction for the false statement on the form re-
quired the suspension of Shrader's medical certificate
until the information requested by the Flight Surgeon had
been provided.2 0
On appeal, the Board affirmed the revocation of
Shrader's airman certificate but reversed the indefinite
suspension of his medical certificate citing FAR
§ 67.3 1.202 Section 67.31 authorizes the suspension,
modification or revocation of any medical certificate if the
applicant "refuse[d] to provide the requested medical in-
formation or history. ' 20 3 The Board wrote:
"[W]hile the respondent might have suspected that the in-
formation sought with regard to an expired certificate
would be pertinent to the issuance of a medical certificate
for which he subsequently applied, we do not think his
failure to provide it voluntarily, that is, without being
asked for it again, in connection with a later application
constitutes a refusal that would authorize the administra-
tor under FAR § 67.31 to suspend or revoke his medical
certificate. We will, accordingly, reverse the indefinite
suspension of that certificate ordered by the law judge. 2 4
Apparently, the significant facts in Shrader were that the
old medical certificate had expired and the Agency had
become aware of Shrader's driving record before he ap-
plied for a new certificate. Shrader failed to reply to the
Agency's inquiries. Accordingly, the charge was trans-
formed from one concerning the making of an intention-
""' See 14 C.F.R. § 67.20(a)(1)(1990) (prohibiting the making of "[a]ny fraudu-
lent or intentionally false statement on any application for a medical" certificate).
2o, Shrader at 4.
202 Id. See 14 C.F.R. § 67.31 (1991).
2- 14 C.F.R. § 67.31 (1991).
"- Id. at 5.
FALSE STATEMENTS
ally false statement with reference to a medical
application into a charge concerning a failure to provide
data regarding his satisfying appropriate medical criteria.
Judge Mullins and the Board could have found that the
Flight Surgeon's letter of inquiry put Shrader on notice
about the "materiality" of his driving record. Thus,
Shrader appears to stand for the proposition that once the
FAA is shown to be aware of convictions, the pilot's fail-
ure to disclose them on subsequent applications is
immaterial.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the DOT investigation, the FAA did not
move quickly to revise the Form. Rather, it continued to
employ an admittedly ambiguous form and sought to clar-
ify the Form's ambiguities by publishing a number of no-
tices in the Federal Register. For its part, DOJ employed
the Form in pursuing criminal prosecutions which Judge
Carr characterized as a "danger to basic justice."
Notwithstanding, a jury recently convicted a pilot on false
statement charges relating to his medical application. °5
In any event, if, as the FAA asserts, there are 6,000 air-
men who are apt to be prosecuted (either criminally or
administratively) for making false statements on the
Form, then there are 6,000 airmen whose constitutional
rights to substantive due process are being violated.
Moreover, there are approximately 700,000 other li-
censed pilots whose civil liberties are at risk.
The FAA's "Draft," however, may "clarify" the rela-
tionship between pilots' driving records and their medical
qualifications for flight. Yet, employing a "Medical
Form" to elicit responses from which a pilot's "moral fit-
ness" is evaluated may result in continued debate about
"trick questions."
Arguably, to the extent the Federal Aviation Regula-
205 See Verdict, United States v. McGeary, No.90-200 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1991)
(on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
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tions preclude pilots having convictions for certain of-
fenses, questions about specific offenses the FAA is
interested in could be listed on a "moral qualifications
questionnaire." Airmen would then know exactly what in-
formation the Agency wants and why it wants it. Finally,
having partially clarified its interest in pilots' driving
records by promulgating new regulations and indicating it
plans to implement a new Form, the Agency should re-
establish the amnesty program for a specified period of
time. Airmen who wished to truthfully answer questions
on future medical applications could do so without fear of
being put in prison or having their licenses revoked based
upon negative responses they may have given to the "con-
victions" questions on earlier Forms. Absent a renewed
amnesty program, many airmen who want to provide full
disclosure concerning their convictions will not do so for
fear of self-incrimination.
